

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry  
64-1844

MAR 11 1964

SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. General Marshall S. Carter  
Deputy Director  
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Levying of Requirements in the Nossenko Case

The attached copy of a letter from Mr. Foster with enclosure sets forth questions of particular significance to ACDA for development during the debriefing of Yuri Nossenko.

Officials in State also have inquired about the levying of requirements.

We would find it helpful to be informed of the subjects on which Nossenko appears knowledgeable and the time when State's requirements might be levied.


Your advice in these matters will be appreciated.

*Thomas L. Hughes*  
Thomas L. Hughes

Attachments:

Letter from Mr. Foster  
w/enclosures

State Department review completed



UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

MAR 4 1984

Dear Tom:

The availability for questioning of a former member of the Soviet delegation to the ENDC offers an unprecedented opportunity for developing an understanding of Soviet attitudes towards arms control proposals and negotiations. I realize that intensive interrogation has been going on now for some days and that, in due course, reports will be made available. Nevertheless, I thought it might be useful to pass on to you some of the questions which we in ACDA feel are of particular significance at this time. These questions break down into four areas: general tactics and composition of the Soviet and Bloc delegations; Soviet policy positions; likely Soviet attitudes with respect to the general policies of other countries; and Soviet attitudes towards specific proposals currently under consideration at Geneva. Our questions are not intended to be comprehensive but, rather, indicate some areas of particular interest. If the source is particularly knowledgeable on specific subjects, more detailed questions can be provided.

Sincerely,

*Bill*

William C. Foster

Enclosure:

List of Questions.

The Honorable  
Thomas L. Hughes,  
Director, Bureau of  
Intelligence and Research,

When separated from attachment, handle this  
Document as

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 4 1984

ACDA Proposed Questions

I. Soviet Tactics and Delegation Composition

1. Elicit information on the way in which arms control and disarmament policies are formulated both in the Foreign Ministry and the other levels at which decisions are taken. Include the roles of the party and the military.
2. What individuals or departments prepare the disarmament position papers? Who finally approves them?
3. Seek information on internal operations of the USSR's Geneva delegation, including biographic information, types of expertise represented thereon, degree of flexibility granted the delegation. What are the functional responsibilities of the members of the Soviet Delegation?
4. How are tactics, strategy and proposals on disarmament developed, coordinated and approved by the Soviets?
5. With respect to disarmament, can hard and soft line groups be identified?
6. How do the Soviets coordinate with the Satellites with respect to disarmament measures?
7. What is the relationship of the Satellites with the Soviets on disarmament? Do the Satellites always clear their proposals with the Soviets before they are proposed?
8. What do the Soviets know about the US disarmament proposals? Are they informed in advance of our future actions?
9. What are the various actions, internal or external, which place the greatest pressure on the Soviets disarmament proposals?
10. What is the morale of Soviet delegation at Geneva?

II. Soviet Arms Control and Disarmament Policy

1. What are the basic and overall objectives of the Soviets with respect to disarmament?

-2-

2. Are the Soviets developing any new disarmament measures? When will these be proposed? What are the details of these proposals?
3. Are the Soviets considering any unilateral disarmament measures?
4. How do the Soviets view the question of verification of retained levels of armaments?
5. Will the Soviets permit adversary inspection? Aerial? Ground?
6. How serious are the Soviets about disarmament and in what fields do they look for concrete progress? Are they just playing for time?
7. Do demands on Soviet economic resources make arms limitations or disarmament attractive to the government? If so, what sorts of measures are most interesting from that viewpoint?
8. What disarmament measures do the Soviets currently favor?

### III. Soviet Attitudes Towards Current Proposals

1. To what extent was the Polish nuclear freeze proposal coordinated with the Soviets? If so, do the Soviets mean this proposal or is it a propaganda move?
2. What is Soviet attitude toward ChiCom participation in the ENDC? What is the Soviet estimate on whether the Chinese would accept? Does the source know about Soviet attitudes toward UN ChiCom participation?
3. Does the source think they will "break off" the Conference if it doesn't seem to be making progress, or go along for an indefinite period?
4. Do the ChiComs seem a threat to the Soviet Union in the short or long term, resulting in modified Soviet view on disarmament?

### IV. Soviet Attitudes with Respect to Specific Proposals

- A. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban

-3-

1. Are the Soviets adamant in their opposition to on-site inspections or will they go back to an allowance of three or so?
2. Does the USSR intend to abrogate or abide by present version? Do they seriously entertain a verified all-elements ban?
3. How seriously does the USSR treat the problem of minor venting?
4. What is the significance of absence, to date, of underground testing by USSR?

B. Ban on Production of Fissionable Material

1. Has there been serious consideration of an agreement with the West on placing limits on production of fissionable material?
2. Will the USSR entertain inspection of any nuclear production facilities.
3. Will there be an attempt to conceal production facilities?

C. Ban on Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. What is the possibility of Soviets signing agreement on non-dissemination without the West abandoning the multi-lateral nuclear force?

D. Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (NDV) Freeze

1. Does the NDV freeze hold potential interest for the Soviets?

E. Observation Posts

1. Are the Soviets interested in the observation post concept or is this a propaganda move?
2. With respect to observation posts, are the Soviets rigid on fixed posts or will they accept roving posts?

F. Separable Measures

1. Are the Soviets interested in making agreements on pre-Stage I measures?

ER 64-1844 /A

13 March 1964

*cur*  
The Honorable Thomas L. Hughes  
Director, Bureau of Intelligence  
and Research  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Tom:

I have your memorandum of 11 March with the questions from Mr. Foster pertaining to Nosenko.

Be assured that the queries will be handled as rapidly as possible. I am leaving town today for a period of about three weeks and will ask Dick Helms to keep you advised on this matter.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA

*EHK:lee*

Distribution:

Orig - Adse

1 - DDCI

✓ 1 - ER (via Ex Dir)

1 - DD/P

1 - C/SR (via DD/P)

NOV 13 3 02 PM '64

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *State*)

Approved For Release 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	Ex Dir		
2	Ex Registry - R. B. J.		
3			
4			
5			
6			
	ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
	CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE

Approved For Release 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5

Approved For Release 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	A/DCI		
2	DD/P		
3	C/SR		
4			
5			
6			
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
Remarks:  3. For action and preparation of response.			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE

Approved For Release 2003/10/02 : CIA-RDP80B01676R000400070008-5